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THE FUMBLE THAT COST TEXAS
by Bob Cunningham
"Texas stands alone in her history preceding admission as a State
into the Union. She was not acquired by treaty [nor] by the blood or the
treasure of the United States. Texas won her independence by her chivalric
courage... . By the wisdom and sagacity ofher own statesmen she establish-
ed her Constitution ... and was recognized by the great powers on earth
as an independent authority.
"She put in successful operation and maintained a civil government.
By the voluntary action ofher own people [and those] of the United States
... she was admitted as a State [in 1845}. The history of Texas [began with]
the introduction of the first colony of Anglo-Americans [in late 1821}. "1
As in this statement by a Texas senator a century ago, Texas can be
proud of winning independence from a repressive, Hispanic government
and going her own way. Yet many costs of that achievement could have
been avoided; a treasonous and little understood "fumble" back in 1806
robbed Texas, and the United States. Like the state of Louisiana, admitted
in 1812, Texas might have begun developing as part of the United States
earlier. If not more fruitful than Texas building alone, at least it would
have started sooner. Anglo history of Texas began well before 1821.
In 1762, Louis XV of France set up the fateful turnover. Through
eighty years of exploration and widely accepted mapping, France claimed
as "Louisiana" much of today's Canada and the United States. (See map.)
In the South that claim ranged north from the Gulf of Mexico and the
west-east Rio Grande, also called the Rio Bravo and the Rio del Norte;
it ranged near west of present Florida to the north-south Rio Grande. It
encompassed today's Texas.
From 200 years of exploration plus colonizing and some administra-
tion, Spain also claimed "Texas." But both France and Spain, ruled by
Bourbon cousins, tolerated each other's conflicting claims. In fact, through
"Family Compacts" of 1733 and 1743, the Catholic cousins made com-
mon cause against invasion of their lands in North America by any Pro-
testant nation - practically, England.
Events in the year 1762 tested that blockade. England took much of
the Northeast from France. It also captured Havana and Manila, key ports
in the Spanish empire. The cousins made their defensive pact world-wide.
Still, they arranged a peace conference with England that would take place
in Paris in 1763.
France foresaw that England would extort all of France's claims in
the New World. So, by the Treaty of Fontainebleau on November 3, 1762,
Louis XV ceded to Spain's Charles III all of France's claims south and
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Map from LouisilUJa in French Diplomacy1759·1804 by E. Wilson Lyon. Copyright
© 1934, 1974 by the University of Oklahoma Press.
west of the Great Lakes. The conveyance cited an eastern edge in the South,
near east of New Orleans, but pointedly did not set a western boundary.
That purposeful omission avoided an issue over both parties' over-
lapping claims to "Texas." France could continue to see that its original
claim in the South ranged to the north-south Rio Grande. Spain could
continue to see that France's legitimate claim ended some 750 miles fur-
ther east, at the Red River if not the Mississippi itself. However conve-
nient for the cousins at the time, that mischief would be compounded and
would jeopardize Texas' early opportunity.
48 EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
The next forty years l 1762-1802, boiled with changes affecting
"Texas. tl Spain lost and regained the Deep South east of the Mississippi.
Its now doubly recognized "title" to the Lower Mississippi region and
the Southwest repeatedly was tested by Americans, English, and resident
French. Most of those acts, lacking support by any nation l were blunted
without change in Spanish sovereignty.
American squatters and British traders slipped into present Alabama,
Arkansas l Louisiana, Mississippi l Missouri l and Texas. From 1768, French
"Tories lt in the Lower Mississippi area launched insurrections. American
Philip Nolan, ostensibly gathering mustangs, spied out and mapped
, 'TexasII as far as the Brazos River before being killed. Georgia established
The Bourbon Company to grab and sell land in West Florida. Pierre Vidal
- one of many French traders in "Texas' l -laid out roadways connecting
San Antonio. Santa Fe, and budding S1. Louis and improved the camino
real to Natchitoches, presumably with Spanish approval.
Other actions were official. The United States pushed Spain into the
Treaty of San Lorenzo, October 7, 1795. That recognized the 31 st parallel,
east of the Mississippi, as the boundary between the United States and
Spain t s West Florida; it also granted Americans use of the Lower Mississip-
pi and the market-port of New Orleans. In 1796 l with the aid of Tennessee
Provincial Senator Willie Blount, England laid out a full scale invasion
from the Gulf. And in 1799, after Spanish authorities again blocked
Americans from New Orleans. the United States threatened invasion.
Earlier in the same period, a series of moves were made to detach
much of the Ohio and Lower Mississippi rivers' drainage from United
States dominance. In 1787, General James Wilkinson "took an oath of
allegiance to Spain Ifor] a trading monopoly in lower Louisiana" and of-
fered to deliver the Ohio/Mississippi basin. 2 In 1788, John Sevier from
North Carolina offered to ally the lower Midwest with Spain. Instead of
accepting either offer, Spain announced that individual Americans were
welcome to settle "as loyal vassals of the king."
Schemes to convey much of our Midwest in the 17805 were not as
far-fetched as they would seem today. They were grounded on the fact
that Americans there largely depended on trade down the Ohio and
Mississippi and back by the same route, plus the overland Natchez Trace
that led north to Nashville. From present West Virginia through Illinois
and southward, none of the region achieved statehood before 1802 ex-
cept Kentucky (1792) and Tennessee (1796). And those two, as well as
the yet-to-be states, looked more to New Orleans than to the hard-to-reach
and commercially cool eastern seaboard.
Under French administration of the Lower Mississippi, traffic with
the Midwest grew with the watering waves of settlers. But, after Spain
took over, trade repeatedly was blocked and re-admitted only under
pressure. In the eyes of many Midwesterners, any alliance that would keep
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the New Orleans trade lanes open could be preferred over having to rely
on the East.
Without this background, the coming fumble - the conniving
negligence that lost Texas - would be hard to understand. Meanwhile,
France became a republic and executed its Bourbon king. Outraged, his
Spanish cousin declared war but was worn down by Napoleon. Sudden-
ly, by the Treaty of San Ildefonso (October 1, 1800), Spain retroceded
to France all of "Louisiana." Again, no western boundary was set.
Pressed by Georgia's insistence on holding land to the west and the
Midwest's demand for access to New Orleans, President Thomas Jeffer-
son approached Napoleon. Robert Livingston. Minister to France, was
directed to find out whether France could deliver West Florida and might
release New Orleans itself.
To the first question, Napoleon was non-committal. Responding to
the New Orleans question on September 15, 1801, he countered with a
staggering proposal: he would sell all of "Louisiana!" However vaguely
bounded, that tract would be larger than the planned extent of the whole
United States. While awaiting sea-borne instructions, Livingston persisted
in trying - even via Joseph Bonaparte in October 1802 - to have West
Florida included in a possible transaction.
Negotiations came to a head on April 12, 1803, when lames Monroe
arrived to aid Livingston. On April 30, officially, the Louisiana Purchase
- for approximately $15,000,000 - was framed. The United States
ratification came on October 20-21. Two months later, initial administra-
tion of the immense package was entrusted to Temporary Governor V.C.C.
Claiborne and, since 1796, the ranking officer of the Army, General James
Wilkinson.
As to the area involved, the key passage in the ratified I'Treaty
Between the United States and the French Republic states:
"ARTICLE I Whereas by the Article the Third of the Treaty of
San Ildefonso ... 1I0ct/1800 '" it was agreed: 'His Catholic Majesty pro-
mises to cede to the French Republic the Colony or Province of Louisiana
with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain and that it
had when France possessed it, and such as it should be after the Treaties
entered into between Spain and other States.' "
Without any mention of specific boundaries, this arms-length con-
veyance continues: I'The French Republic has incontestable title to the
domain and to the possession of said Territory." 3 Although its ratifica-
tion was couched in United States Statutes of October 31, and November
10, 1803, "The question of the limits of the (retro-]ceded territory ... was
kept in the background."4
Why the United States accepted a literally boundless conveyance is
hard to understand, except that Washington continued to hope that West
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Florida could be included by negotiation. That aim was the main topic
of Secretary of State James Madison's lengthy directive to Livingston in
Paris dated March 31, 1804. But he did refer to the southern section of
the Louisiana Purchase:
"In the delivery of the province by the Spanish authorities to M.
Laussat [Colonial Perfect of "Louisiana"] nothing passed denoting its
limits either to the east, the west, or the north. [Privately, however,
Laussat] stated positively that no part of the Floridas was included in the
eastern boundary. With respect to the western extent of Louisiana, M.
Laussat held a language more satisfactory. He considered the Rio Bravo,
or Del Norte, as far as the 30th degree of north latitude, to be its boundary
on that side."5
Pierre Clement de Laussat had not been selected because he was im-
prudent; sources reporting French archives say he was instructed to say
just what he said about boundaries. On that basis, in 1804, Jefferson
warned Spain to evacuate "Texas." He also ordered Colonel Thomas
Freeman to explore the Red River, flowing southeast through present Loui-
siana, and Thomas Dunbar to probe the Ouachita, a tributary of the Red.
Both expeditions were merely scouting parties; Dunbar's took only
three months and Freeman's was turned back by the Spanish force alerted
where to find him. By then General Wilkinson had been made governor
of Louisiana Territory, the main mass north and west of present Loui-
siana. For his private purposes, he sent Lieutenant Zebulon Pike to locate
the headwaters of both the Arkansas and the Red rivers. At the same time,
he again alerted the Spanish authorities. Pike and his dozen men were
found in a token fort on the Upper Rio Grande, nor far from Santa Fe,
at the most westerly edge of the claim sold by France.
Pike's reception significantly differed from the fate of Nolan seven
years earlier. Instead of being killed, he was entertained and escorted back
by relays of troops. His journal shows that he found them a caricature
of a fighting force. The haughty Spanish officers traveled in luxury; the
cavalry was more dashing than militarily effectual; the foot soldiers, woeful
peons, were poorly armed and as badly trained.
If General Wilkinson was surprised that Spain backed off from mak-
ing an issue of Pike's blatant incursion. he might be excused. His even
more personal plans and record came in jeopardy, and his future was
threatened with disgrace.
Early in the summer of 1805, after ending his vice-presidency, Aaron
Burr traveled down the Ohio River recruiting armeo support for a secret
mission. He called on Wilkinson in S1. Louis. Whatever their private talks,
"General Wilkinson provided Burr a well appointed barge, ten enlisted
men and a sergeant [Plus] letters of instruction to Daniel Clark and several
Spanish officials in New Orleans. To Clark [former U.S. Consul, denied
the governorship, and conspiring against Claiborne] Wilkinson wrote:
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lTo him [Burr] I refer you for many things improper to letter .. _.' "6
After three weeks in New Orleans, Burr returned to the East. "He
told the French and Spanish ambassadors in Washington that he intended
to effect a separation of the [Midwest] .... He told the British minister
that New Orleans and West Florida were his objectives. To Wilkinson,
Clark and the [insurgent] Mexican Association he had revealed that the
invasion of Mexico was his aim. H7
Wilkinson always covered his tracks. His many transactions with the
Spanish were in code; even his name was a numeral. But decoded copies
are in Spanish archives and many of his secret activities have been traced.
What came to be called "The Burr Conspiracy" has been examined ex-
haustively by historians. The scholar quoted above is among the few to
doubt that Wilkinson himself conceived the plot, that he confided it to
Burr in meetings in Philadelphia and Washington, and that Burr simply
did more toward carrying it out.
Perhaps to leaven his own conclusions, the same scholar quotes
another historian: "To the last Wilkinson continued to pose as an honest
man, was protected and honored by Jefferson, was acquitted by a pack-
ed court of inquiry, and left as justification for his deeds three ponderous
volumes of memoirs as false as any written by man!'8
We are not concerned with Wilkinson's career. But his perennial con-
nivance with Spain and his role in the Burr Conspiracy help to explain
the fumble that cost Texas. In the fall of 1806, the Spanish colonial ad-
ministration staged a show to stop infiltration from the northeast.
Lieutenant-Colonel (also Governor of Nuevo Leon and later General)
Simon de Herrera led more than 1,000 soldiers with cannon to Natchitoches
in the upper middle of present Louisiana. Rebuked as an invader by of-
ficials there, he withdrew to Los Adaes.
Claiborne, by then full governor of New Orleans Territory, called
out the militia. Secretary of War Henry Dearborn ordered that three com-
panies of Regulars with two field pieces be sent to bolster Wilkinson's
substantial force quartered at St. Louis. He also ordered Wilkinson south
to repel the Spanish intruders and to "hold the Sabine River [boundary]."
Wilkinson shortly received an undercover, civilian courier from
Philadelphia. The conspiratorial packet included an appalling note from
New Jersey Senator Jonathan Dayton. At the coming session of Congress,
Wilkinson was to be arraigned and dismissed from his post! Instead of
becoming "the George Washington of the West," heading a new nation
that would embrace the midwest and much of Mexico, the commanding
general of the United States Army would be disgraced!
Any forceful confrontation of Los Adaes could cause the Spanish
to expose his twenty years of selling them United States plans. "If Spain
revealed his secret dealings ... Wilkinson would be a candidate for a firing
squad. Realizing his schemes could no longer be sustained, Wilkinson
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extracted himself with brilliance .... He wrote President Jefferson that
he was on the trail of a great conspiracy [led by] Aaron Burr .... He per-
sonally preferred charges that Burr was out to separate Kentucky and the
Louisiana Purchase from the United States."9
That explosive charge would at least postpone the Congressional in-
vestigation; it would also counter any charge by Burr, who already was
in ill repute. Since losing the presidency to Jefferson, the resentful vice-
president's actions were increasingly suspect. For forcing Alexander
Hamilton into a duel and killing him, Burr was ostracized widely. And,
his recent moves to gather a force in the Midwest and New Orleans had
not gone unnoticed.
By sacrificing his prime pawn, Wilkinson disarmed the threat to
himself that was at once most immediate and, as he was ordered to duty
in the West. hardest for him to handle personally in the East. He still could
not risk anyone else possibly irritating Herrera. Wilkinson's orders directly
from the Secretary of War gave Claiborne's militia an excuse to back off
while the general made his way to Los Adaes.
Before leaving St. Louis, he rushed one of his coded reports to the
top authority of New Spain: the Viceroy in Mexico City. It was a shock-
ing block against Spanish exposure of their secret alliance. He reported
that Burr was leading a force to invest all Mexico! Wilkinson added realistic
detail, including a request for funds. He stated that, ordered to meet Her-
rera's thrust, he could prevent Burr's invasion and confine any issue to
the eastern border.
Stalling through protocol with Herrera while anxiously awaiting word
from the Viceroy, Wilkinson further protected his rear. To the Secretary
of War he sent his official, and demonstratively patriotic, view of the
military prospect. "If means and men are furnished, I shall plant our stan-
dards on the left bank of the Grand [Rio Grande] River. "I 0
That document is notable on three counts. On the Department of War
record, it could be expected to show his zeal to any doubters and so slow
if not prevent Wilkinson's arraignment. By calling for support that might
be difficult for the United States to provide, it could invite orders not to
advance militarily; such orders would avoid his having to attack and thus
would reduce the risk of his Spanish connnection being exposed. And,
whatever its degree of sincerity, the letter indicates that the general con-
sidered it both welcome in Washington and feasible to take over "Texas."
Perhaps reflecting concern that Mexico was vulnerable, the Viceroy
replied to Wilkinson with unusual promptness. He appreciated the warn-
ing as he would further good offices while awaiting directions from
Madrid. Reassured that Spain wanted to continue their alliance in secret,
Wilkinson moved into private talks with Herrera. He outlined the immi-
nent threat to Mexico. Herrera, already impressed by the evident number
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of Regulars and the unexpected field guns, must have worried about facing
an invasion by a larger force.
Wilkinson suggested that the two military leaders work out a com-
promise, one that would remove any excuse for invasion of Mexico and
permit both the Spanish and the United States forces to retire with honor.
The Viceroy's messenger may have brought new orders to Herrera;
regardless, he feared that help would not arrive before the expected
invaders. Herrera agreed to negotiate.
Whatever Hererra's orders, Wilkinson was not authorized to make
any deal, much less to compromise the United States position stretching
to the Sabine River. Yet, to serve himself, he did both.
He knew that the United States had proposed to Spain that, pending
settlement of the southwestern boundary of the Louisiana Purchase,
"Texas" be considered Neutral Ground. The area between the Sabine and
the north-south Rio Grande was specified. When Spain demurred, the
United States began to organize the territory east of the Sabine.
Now Herrera and Wilkinson agreed that the United States forces
would withdraw to the Arroyo Hondo, east of the Sabine. Herrera would
withdraw to the west bank of the Sabine and the intervening land would
be Neutral Ground. The opposing forces withdrew and the arrangement,
although not authorized by the United States, was accepted by both
governments.
Consider the opportunity for both Texas and the United States that
was missed. The record indicates that Spanish policy, dictated from
Madrid, was to contain American intrusions without risking war. Wilkin-
son's force - nine companies of Regulars plus some 800 volunteers -
outweighed Herrera's. The whole Spanish colonial military lacked the sup-
port necessary to fight across Texas; American squatters and restive Mex-
icans there, inviting invasion, would dilute what thin support was available.
Under almost anyone other than Wilkinson, a forceful advance -
instead of his give-away - almost certainly would have started a successful
campaign. Much of Texas could have been taken before orders could be
received from distant Washington. And, with momentum achieved on the
honorable quest to collect the southern part of what we had bought from
France, it would have been difficult for Washington not to extend the
move.
Wilkinson escaped his due but his self-serving retreat from Los Adaes
indirectly led to a second opportunity to embrace Texas. In 1808, Napoleon
deposed the Spanish monarchy. After generations of over-centralized
government, the Spanish empire had no leadership. New Spain, excepting
the lordly aristocrats, rallied to the grito! of a native Mexican priest in
1810. The military could not cope with all of the uprisings.
In evidence of New Spain's weakness, Americans who had settled in
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West Florida rebelled and captured Baton Rouge. Governor Claiborne
handily annexed the area to his own. Meanwhile, the Neutral Ground had
become a haven for outlaws and blocked trade. In 1811, Lieutenant
Augustus Magee was directed to clear it out. Doing so, he saw the good
prospect of continuing through Texas. When Washington failed to
authorize the move, Magee resigned his commission.
One may be reminded of Washington's refusal to let United States
troops occupy all of Berlin in World War II - and the resulting problems.
True, at the time of the Texas fumble(s), the United States was being drawn
into the War of 1812 with England and did not need another. But it also
is true that the East-dominated government was more intent on acquiring
Gulf Coast land east of New Orleans than acquiring Texas.
Thus, in 1819, two segments of Florida's panhandle were obtained
from Spain while Washington would continue to ignore opportunities,
and requests, to embrace the Southwest within its Louisiana Purchase.
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